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WILLIAM B. FISCH
European Analogues to the Class Action: Group
Action in France and Germany'
For the civil proceduralist in the United States the most per-
plexing problems of recent years have been presented by claims of
large numbers of persons against large economic interests. A single
error in manufacturing design can cause a relatively small injury to
each of a large number of consumers; a misrepresentation in na-
tional advertising for such goods can have similar consequences; the
polluting effects of a single enterprise can be dispersed among a
large neighboring population. The result is that the stake of each
potential claimant in the outcome of the litigation can be greatly
outweighed by the magnitude of the wrongdoer's total potential ex-
posure and by the expenses of litigating the substantive issues.
When the government involves itself in such problems, through
legislative and administrative decisions attempting to regulate the
risk-creating activities, the procedural issue may be whether per-
sons other than those directly regulated should be permitted to take
the initiative in bringing matters to court, to by-pass or force the
hand of an erring or reluctant enforcement agency.
A major underlying theme, no doubt, is the complex of inter-
locking relationships between individuals, groups of persons simi-
larly situated and governments, competing in a sense for the right to
pursue persons or enterprises who have violated the law and in-
flicted injury. Even more than in other areas of procedure, the allo-
cation of responsibility and opportunity for bringing wrongdoers to
court is closely bound up with substantive policy. It is clear for ex-
ample that restrictive attitudes toward procedural devices such as
class actions, when expressed in a specific case, may well reflect am-
bivalence toward the underlying norms, sympathy with the wrong-
doer, unwillingness to impose unduly drastic consequences on a
particular wrongdoer where others are perceived as getting by, or
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simply the conclusion that the courts are not suitable instruments
for the solution of certain problems.2
Other advanced industrialized nations have faced the same
problems, and comparative study in this area has been active in re-
cent years. In 1973, the German Society for the Comparative Study
of Law held a symposium on "Private Suits in the Public Interest,"
to which Professors Adolf Homburger of Buffalo and Hein K6tz of
Konstanz contributed papers of impressive insight and scholarship.3
In 1974 one of the topics for the 9th International Congress of Com-
parative Law at Teheran was the "The Role of the Ministbre Public
in Civil Proceedings," for which Professor Mauro Cappelletti of Flo-
rence and Stanford wrote the general report and later published an
expanded version.4 Professor Cappelletti is conducting a longterm
study on access to justice, in which the judicial handling of "diffuse"
or "meta-individual" interests has received specific comparative
analysis.5
In this comparative work, as in much of the American literature
on domestic problems, there is a strong tendency to concentrate on
the "public interest," as if the principal issue were the extent to
which private initiative can be harnessed to the general welfare as a
supplement to more usual governmental resources. It is thereby
properly recognized that "massification"6 has made the individualis-
tic premises of traditional litigation forms obsolete. The irony of
such titles as "private suits in the public interest," however, is pre-
cisely the invocation of the outdated dichotomy between public in-
terest, ordinarily represented by government, and the purely
private.
What is involved, in fact, is an entire spectrum of group situa-
tions, ranging from material injury to many specific and identifiable
persons (mass accident, consumer fraud, pollution of a specific body
of water) to essentially non-material offense against general moral
sensibilities (pornography, prostitution). The violator may be an
individual, an enterprise or an agency of the government itself. The
common procedural issue is whether the entire group affected can
be brought into the litigation. In general, the more "diffuse" and
non-material the interest sought to be vindicated, the greater the
would-be champion's difficulty in establishing the right to sue.
2. See e.g., Judge Medina's opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d
1005, 1018f. (2d Cir. 1973).
3. Homburger & Kotz, Klagen Privater im offentlichen Interesse (1975);
Homburger, "Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of America," 23
Buffalo L. Rev. 343 (1974).
4. Cappelletti, "Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in
Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study," 73 Mich. L. Rev. 800 (1975).
5. Cappelletti, "Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts: A Compara-
tivist's View," 25 Buffalo L. Rev. 643 (1976).
6. Id. at pp. 645f.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 52 1979
FISCH: EUROPEAN CLASS ACTION ANALOGUES
I propose in this article to examine the group action phenome-
non in France and Germany. I shall adopt the perspective of a
fairly typical American class-action plaintiff: an individual whose
private interests suggest litigation, but who is or may be discour-
aged from going it alone by costs of litigation and the strength of the
opposing forces. The question is the extent to which the individual
can mobilize others who share his fate, either to share the burden of
litigation or to add weight to the claim.
The frequency with which this strategy will be considered in a
given system will obviously be affected by structural factors, among
the most important of which are the costliness of litigation generally
and the availability of alternative forms of assistance to the individ-
ual litigant. It may be assumed for present purposes that to the ex-
tent the system provides effective forms of direct assistance-legal
expense insurance, group legal services, small claims courts, legal
aid, direct intervention of the state-it will seem less desirable to
the individual to try to mobilize group action. It is impossible in
this article to give more than a hint of these aspects of the systems
under study; nonetheless it seems appropriate to begin with some
reference to a few of them in the French and German procedural
systems.
I. SOME BASIC NOTIONS 7
A) Civil, Criminal or Administrative Courts
For the American lawyer, the questions we are dealing with
here belong to civil procedure, with some added twists where ad-
ministrative decisions are involved. Moreover, except for the very
real complication of choosing between state and federal courts, we
usually think of a single set of courts in a given jurisdiction. The
private claimant is effectively excluded from the criminal process in
our country, due to the entrenched doctrine of prosecutorial discre-
tion; and review of administrative decisions is usually handled by
the regular courts.
In Europe, on the other hand, and especially in France, there
are typically three entirely separate procedural systems involved in
these questions: civil, criminal and administrative, connected at the
top by some mechanism for deciding jurisdictional conflicts. One of
the strong features of these systems (as we will see, France shows it
much more than Germany) is a significant overlap of function with
respect to private claims, in that a person injured by a reason of a
violation of a penal law may have the option of pursuing his claim in
7. Many of us who teach general comparative law courses are accustomed to
referring our students to Professor Comparovich of Ruritania in order to Smooth
their procedural Edges--please forgive, Professor Schlesinger, Comparative Law
269f., esp. 275-82 (3rd ed. 1970).
19791
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conjunction with the criminal prosecution,8 and in that private
claims against the government may be pursued in administrative
courts.
B) Costs and Attorneys' Fees in Civil Cases
Another fundamental point of comparison between the systems
we are considering-perhaps the most fundamental one in this
area-concerns the handling of major litigation costs. Since to a
large extent the issues of standing to litigate and the suitability of
representative forms of action become contested issues precisely
because of the costliness of modern lawsuits, the way in which the
system allocates the major cost items can determine the strength of
the felt need for alternatives to the archetypical two-party lawsuit.
(1) Attorneys'fees as taxable costs. In all three systems, the
loser must normally pay the winner's court costs; but should that in-
clude attorneys' fees? The American rule excluding them, pocked
with statutory and judicial exceptions 9 but ringingly affirmed in
principle by the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wil-
derness Society,10 finds few adherents abroad. In Germany they are
normally included-not, to be sure, what is actually agreed between
lawyer and client, but rather an amount fixed by the law, usually in
terms of a percentage of, or as a function of, the amount in contro-
versy." While it is permissible at least in Germany for a client to
agree in writing to a higher fee than that prescribed by the statutory
schedule, 12 it is likely that in most instances the schedule will pre-
vail, and therefore the cost indemnity will be effective.' 3
8. See the overview in Jolowicz, Procedural Questions pp. 4-15, in Intern. Encycl.
Comp. L. XI (Torts) ch. 13 (1970).
9. See e.g., Note, "Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule," 25 DrakeL.
Rev. 717 (1976).
10. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Of the flood of print on this case see e.g., Cedar, "Defrost-
ing the Alyeska Chill: The Future of Attorneys' Fees Awards in Environmental Litiga-
tion," 5 Environmental Affairs 297 (1976). Some states have taken a contrary view,
sustaining awards on the so-called "private attorney general" theory at least in lim-
ited circumstances; see e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977).
11. See Bundesgebiuhrenordnung fir Rechtsanwalte (BRAGebO), Anlage zu § 11.
The law of costs is currently the subject of heated debate. In 1975 the government,
the Bundestag (lower house) and Bundesrat (upper house) were unable to agree on
a revision of the general fee scale, though all agreed that an increase in fee levels
was indicated. See Baumgtirtel, "Kostenexplosion im Bereich des Rechtsschut-
zes?", 1975 BB 678-9. In September 1976, the 51st Assembly of German Lawyers
(Juristentag) agreed without dissent that changes were needed in the law of costs,
and made a number of recommendations. See 1976 NJW 2004.
12. BRAGebO § 3.
13. It is very tempting to speculate on the effect of this difference, but clear fac-
tual conclusions are not to be expected. Cf. Cedar, supra n. 10 at 302f. On the face
of it, one would have to assume that the American rule would discourage meritorious
claims, because of the substantial residual cost of vindication, and would encourage
nuisance suits, because of the pressure to settle produced by the residual costs to the
[Vol. 27
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In France, on the other hand, the picture is mixed. Under the
prior law, only the statutorily regulated fees for the written work of
the avouL were included in taxable costs, while the potentially
much larger honoraria of the avocat were excluded as a gratuity; de-
spite the substantial merger of the two professions in 1972, this dis-
tinction of functions still persists for cost purposes. 14 However the
new Code of Civil Procedure of 1975 contains the following provi-
sion, as amended in 1976:
Where it appears inequitable to leave a party with the ex-
penses incurred by it which are not included in taxable
costs, the judge may require the other party to pay it such
amount as he determines.1 5
While much will depend on the manner in which the provision is ad-
ministered by the courts, it is regarded as a significant reform. 16
2) The contingent fee. Despite the fact that the losing party
does not bear the burden of the winner's attorney's fees, it is still
thought appropriate in this country to provide a means of relieving a
claimant from the risk of having to pay his own attorney when he
loses. For the moment, in civil cases, our most common answer to
defendant. On the other hand, the German rule would discourage questionable
claims because of the increased cost of failure. That this common sense assumption
is often shared by American lawmakers can be deduced from the frequency with
which attorney's fees for successful claimants are expressly provided for when it is
thought desirable to encourage private litigation, usually without a corresponding ob-
ligation for the unsuccessful claimant. See Note, supra n. 9 at 717-719. On the other
hand, it is legitimate to wonder whether the statutory fee scales which accompany
the German rule would have a depressing effect on the imagination and enterprise of
the lawyer, and also to ask whether the greatest risk should be placed on the loser
precisely when-judging from the fact of full, all-out litigation-the outcome is most
uncertain. Cf. Kaplan, "An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions of
English Civil Procedure," 69 Mich. L. Rev. 821, 835-6 (1971).
14. The current taxable cost rule is contained in (New) Code of Civil Procedure
Art. 695, Decree No. 75-1123, 5 Dec. 1975, Juris-Classeur Prriodique (Semaine
Juridique) (J.C.P,) 1975, Suppl. to No. 52. This provision covers remuneration of
avocats (the old honorarium, traditionally excluded as "gratuity") "to the extent that
it is regulated." While it appears that a fee scale for the avocat function was contem-
plated in conjunction with the 1972 reform, none has materialized, and the old
avocats resist it for the same reason that American lawyers would resist the idea of a
statutory fee scale generally. See for general discussion including the fee problem,
Herzog & Herzog, "The Reform of the Legal Professions and of Legal Aid in France,"
22 Int. & Comp. L. Q. 462 (1973); Ancel, "Some Recent Reforms in the French Legal
Profession," 18 Jur. Rev. (N.S.) 209 (1973). On the pre-reform law see Herzog, Civil
Procedure in France 536-7 (1967).
15. Decree No. 76-714, art. 5, of 29 July 1976; J.C.P. 1976. III. 44619, modifying art.
700 of the New Code of Civil Procedure.
16. See Boccara, "La Condamnation aux Honoraires (Article 700 du Nouveau
Code de Procedure Civile)," J.C.P. 1976 I. 2828. One writer has found support in re-
cent unpublished decisions of courts of appeals for the proposition that it is normally
equitable to impose additional fees and expenses on a party from whose act the liti-
gation arose (negligence, breach of contract, etc.): Loyer-Larher, "L'Article 700 du
nouveau code de procedure civile et le remboursement des frais non compris dans les
d~pens," D.S. 1977. Chron. 205, 208-9.
19791
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this problem is the contingent fee, which in effect allows the attor-
ney to assume the risk of losing. Most other countries, including
France, Germany and England, consider the contingent fee to be un-
ethical, because it destroys the professional independence of the at-
torney.17
3) Legal aid in civil cases. It is also part of the tradition in
both France and Germany to provide legal aid to civil litigants who
cannot afford even provisionally to absorb costs and fees. In both
systems there has.been dissatisfaction. In France, prior to the great
reform of the legal professions in 1971-72, the appointment of the
lawyer to a legal aid case operated very much like the contingent fee
in its negative aspect, in that the attorney did not get paid if the cli-
ent lost;18 under the new law an "indemnity" is provided by the
state in such cases, which in turn is substantially lower than the
normal fee. 19 In Germany the attorney appointed in a legal aid case
has long received compensation from the state, but also at reduced
rates; the entire system is now being debated, and the one proposi-
tion that the lawyers can agree on with virtual unanmity is that re-
forms of the cost and legal aid systems must not come at the
expense of the lawyers.20 So far as I am aware there are no fixed
legal aid offices with salaried staff lawyers for civil litigation in ei-
ther system. However, despite the difficulties for the lawyers at-
tendant on differentiating financially between legal aid clients and
regular clients, it does appear that public assistance in civil cases is
more readily available in Europe than in the U.S.2 1
17. See Schlesinger, Comparative Law 275-6, 478-85 (3d ed. 1970). It is worth not-
ing, of course, that there is a trend toward the regulation of the contingent fee, either
generally [New Jersey Sup. Ct. Rule 1:21-7(c) (1972)] or with respect to specific types
of actions [Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146 (1975) on medical malpractice claims].
18. See Herzog, Civil Procedure in France 549 (1967).
19. See Herzog & Herzog, supra n. 14 at 486-7. The conditions of eligibility for le-
gal aid are in simple terms of monthly income, the maximum amounts being fixed in
the annual budget; the most recent budget law L. No. 77-1467 art. 96, D.S. 1978 L. 39
fixes the income ceiling at 1620 F. for full aid, and 2700 F. for partial aid (the exchange
rate now being between 20 and 25 cents to the franc).
20. In September 1976, the Assembly of German Lawyers approved the following
resolution by a vote of 152-5, 8 abstaining- "The lawyer should receive a full fee in liti-
gation-aid cases." 1976 NJW 2007, resolution I. 14. The discussion includes extra-ju-
dicial aid as well, see Blankenburg, "Rechtsberatung als Hilfe und als Barriere auf
dem Weg zum Recht," 1976 Z. Rechtspolitik 93; Redeker, "Zur Stellung der Anwalt-
schaft im aussergerichtlichen Rechtsberatungssystem," id. at 97; generally Baur,
"Kostenrecht-Armenrecht," 1976 NJW 1380; Gottwald, "Armenrecht in Westeuropa
und die Reform des deutschen Rechts," Z. Zivilprozess (ZZP) 89, 136 (1976).
21. See e.g., Cappelletti, "Social and Political Aspects of Civil Proce-
dure-Reforms and Trends in Western and Eastern Europe," 69 Mich. L. Rev. 847,
870f. (1971).
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II. CLASS AND GROUP ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A) Salient Features of the Class Action
It is not my purpose to rehearse the problems of the class action
here, for they are or should be painfully familiar. Indeed, the class
action as hot topic has recently received the ultimate compliments:
a proposed Uniform Class Action Act 22 and a Harvard Law Review
Developments note.23 It is appropriate however to call attention to
those features of the class action which distinguish it from other
procedural devices.
(1) The class action is a representative action, whereby one or
more members of the class litigate on behalf of all the members; as
we shall see, representative actions are not unknown in France and
Germany, though they appear in somewhat different form.
(2) The litigation is typically commenced on the individual
initiative of the representative member, who bears the initial and in
many cases the ultimate burden of costs; again, in a somewhat dif-
ferent form this is also possible in France and Germany.
(3) Particularly with respect to mass claims, the representa-
tive is usually self-appointed in the true sense, without the benefit
of any pre-existing relationship among the members, based solely
on the fact of their common fate at the hands of the wrongdoer; it is.
this feature which is most difficult to find reflected in European de-
vices.
2 4
The principal procedural purpose to be filled by the representa-
tive action is economy: on the one hand, to enable courts to adjudi-
cate many claims and/or deal with many claimants in a single
lawsuit without unnecessary duplication of proof; and on the other
hand, to enable claimants to spread the costs of litigation. The ma-
jor problems on which opponents have focused are, of course, also
economic: on the one hand, the class action may increase the bur-
den on the courts, if it can be assumed that without it there would
not in fact be many separate lawsuits; and on the other, it may make
litigation so expensive for the defendant that meritorious defenses
will be foregone in favor of pretrial settlement. It is clear that the
desirability of imposing such burdens on courts and defend-
ants-and obviously not all class actions will involve undue bur-
dens-must be related to the strength of the policy underlying the
norms which the lawsuit seeks to enforce.25
22. 12 U.L.A. (Master Ed.). Supplement 1977 at pp. 10f.
23. "Developments in the Law-Class Actions," 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1319-1644 (1976).
24. It is, of course, this feature which has created the most difficulty for us, by
making it so important for the court to evaluate the suitability of the class represen-
tative to function as such; without it (or rather with assurance of pre-existing rela-
tionship) it can be supposed that the problems of notice and opportunity to be heard
would loom much less large.
25. This is, I take it, the burden of the Harvard Law Review's "substantive theory
19791
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Perhaps the aspect of the American class action for damages
which is the most notable to European eyes is the role of the lawyer
in developing, managing, and often financing the lawsuit. The per-
missibility both of the contingent fee and advancement of litigation
expenses makes many class actions in effect lawyers' enterprises, in
which the stake of the attorney is far greater than that of any of his
clients, and in which the attorneys' fee may reach unseemly levels. 26
When it is asked whether this or that country should adopt the class
action as a procedural device, the answer will quickly turn on
whether or not the class action will work without the contingent
fee. 27 Here it is easy to forget that in most class actions for dam-
ages, any fee to be collected out of the proceeds of victory must be
approved by the court so that there is some opportunity to hold the
fee down to an acceptable level. Moreover, the contingent fee
works only in damages cases, not in injunctive relief cases which do
not produce monetary recovery for the clients.28
The contingent fee controversy does illustrate a major weakness
of the class action device, as currently conceived, as a method of fa-
cilitating access to the courts for mass claims: it does not automati-
cally provide a means of sustaining the running costs of litigation
pending final judgment. So long as the resources of the absent
members of the class 29 and the opponent3 0 remain protected, the
of class action": that cost-burden arguments are inadequate to justify keeping or
eliminating class actions, because they are inconclusive bases for generalization;
rather, the Review says, the principal value of the class action is to enable the court
to see and understand the full range of interests involved in a given dispute, so as
better to implement substantive policies. Note, supra n. 23 at 1353-72.
26. See Kotz, "Klagen Privater im offentlichen Interesse," in Homburger & Kotz,
supra n. 3 at 84-7. If we assume that the plaintiffs contingent fee would run to 1/3 by
contract, and probably 15-25% in court-approved class actions cases, the contrast with
the German situation is interesting. In 1958 Professors Kaplan, von Mehren & Schae-
fer estimated that the total cost burden on the loser, including attorney's fees, for
both sides, would run about 7.1% for a $25,000 case (then current exchange rates,
100,000 DM): "Phases of German Civil Procedure," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1465 (1958).
More recently it has been estimated that the rules now in effect would result in a to-
tal taxable cost burden of about 19.2%: Baumgirtel, "Kostenexplosion im Bereich des
Rechtsschutzes?", 1975 BB 675.
27. See comments by Schricker, in Homburger & Kotz, id. at 103-4. For the view
that the contingent fee is not an essential passenger in the transplantation of the
class action, see Koch, Kollektiver Rechtschutz Im Zivilprozess 95-6 (1976).
28. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-20 (1969).
29. The general proposition that absent members of a class, not being formal par-
ties to the litigation, are entitled to a "free ride" has been qualified to the extent of
permitting discovery of relevant information from them, Brennan v. Midwestern Life
Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), but this is an exceptional situation, Clark v. Uni-
versal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974). See Federal Judicial Center, Man-
ual for Complex Litigation 50 (1977); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1787 (1972). Even non-binding solicitations of assistance from absentees
after the class action has been certified, while probably permissible, are subjected in
the federal courts to prior judicial authorization, see Manualfor Complex Litigation
27f, ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Opinion
1326 (1975).
[Vol. 27
HeinOnline  -- 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 58 1979
FISCH: EUROPEAN CLASS ACTION ANALOGUES
representative's financial commitment is increased rather than miti-
gated by choosing the class action. In effect, therefore, the device
presupposes the existence of a representative capable of financing
the litigation and willing to risk total loss of the investment.
B) Pre-existing Associations and Groups as Claimants: Standing
It is also not consistent with the purpose of this paper to review
the great American debates over the law of standing, and in particu-
lar the standing of groups and associations to challenge governmen-
tal action.3 1 I believe that experience since Sierra Club v. Morton32
has shown that groups like the Sierra Club and other environmental
organizations, or Ralph Nader's various consumer troupes, have had
no difficulty in gaining access to the courts so long as their member-
ship included some persons who were intended to be protected by
the laws invoked and whose interests are or would be adversely af-
fected by the action challenged.
On the other hand, it is the clear lesson of Sierra Club that a
group must show at least that much individualized injury in fact; the
Supreme Court has never authorized the purely ideological action to
review administrative acts. The recent standing decisions in what
Cappelletti has called the Court's "crusade against public interest
litigation ' 33 all involve determinations that no member of the group
suing could individually satisfy the standing requirements. 34 In re-
lation to our specific theme of group action as an alternative to indi-
vidual action, therefore, the case law on standing in the U.S. may
properly be characterized as liberal.
In most such actions, of course, no damages are sought for the
group, but rather injunctive or declaratory relief. In effect, the
group is a source of initative and financing, which does not accom-
plish more than a comparably financed and motivated individual
could do alone, unless it is by means of a greater credibility.
30. The Supreme Court's view that the representative plaintiff, rather than the
defendant, should bear the cost of sending notice to absentees [Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)] has now been extended to discovery related to notice
in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 98 S. Ct. 391 (1978).
31. See the discussion by Homburger, supra n. 3 at 385f., useful precisely because
it was prepared for an audience of comparatists trained principally in other systems.
32. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
33. Cappelletti, supra n. 5 at 650.
34. E.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26
(1976) (poor person denied free service at hospital); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975) (low-income minority person denied low-income housing in a suburb by rea-
son of zoning ordinance excluding such housing); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974) (criminal defendant alleging that the bail and sentence system in particular
magistrate court was discriminatory). On the standing issue, criticizing the Court's
recent decisions principally on the ground that they confuse the merits with the right
to sue, see Tushnet, "The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment," 62 Corn.
L. Rev. 663 (1977).
1979]
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The French law has for a long time provided for two actions in
response to a violation of criminal law: the public action (by the
state, for the imposition of penal sanction), and the private action
(by the victim, for damages or other civil relief). The basic rules
governing the availability of the private action (action civile) are
now embodied in arts. 1-10 of the 1957 Code of Criminal Procedure
(c.p.p.).
The private action is available for any violation (art. 2),36 and
may be brought be anyone who personally suffers damage directly
caused by such violation. It may be brought either in a criminal
court in conjunction with the public action (art. 3) or separately in a
civil court (art. 4). All damage resulting from the infraction is re-
coverable, whether material or non-material (art. 3). Except for
limitations periods, the substantive rules of the civil code govern the
private action (art. 10), but where the private action is brought in
criminal court, the rules of criminal procedure apply.3 7
Art. 3. c.p.p. and its predecessors have been understood to mean
that the private action before a criminal court may only be brought
in conjunction with the public action,38 and that the court must
render judgment on both actions at the same time (so-called "rule of
solidarity of actions").39 Since the law also provides that the public
action may be initiated by the injured party (art. 1), the courts have
held since the beginning of the century that institution of the pri-
vate action automatically sets the public action in motion, whether
or not the prosecuting authorities find cause to proceed.4°
35. See the overview in Larguier, "The Civil Action for Damages in French Crimi-
nal Procedure," 39 TuL L. Rev. 687 (1965).
36. Certain violations deemed to involve exclusively the public interest, such as
tax claims, are excluded by caselaw, see Jolowicz, supra n. 8 at p. 6.
37. Encyclopedie Dalloz, Action Civile 545 (1974).
38. See Bouzat et Pinatel, 2 Trait6 de Droit Pnale et de Criminologie 983
(1970).
39. Encyclopedie Dalloz, Action Civile 11 556-571 (1974).
40. Bouzat et Pinatel, supra n. 38 $ 986. The French prosecutor is given a certain
degree of discretion in determining whether or not to prosecute, c.p.p. art. 40, see
Bouzat et Pinatel 1 972.
It used to be thought that acquittal on the criminal charge would require dismis-
sal of the action civile for lack of competence, but in 1976, the Criminal Chamber of
the Court of Cassation held that the trial court must render judgment on the merits
against the partie civile in such a case (Cass. Crim. 5 May 1976; Rec. Dalloz-S. 1976,
494). In the specific case of felonies (crimes) however, cognizable only in the Assize
Court, c.p.p. art. 372 expressly authorizes judgment in favor of a partie civile forfaute
(civil fault) involved in the conduct prosecuted, even when the defendant is acquitted
of the criminal charge. If the new position of the Criminal Chamber holds, the pri-
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If the private action is brought in a civil court, and no public ac-
tion in the criminal courts is pending, the private action proceeds
simply as an ordinary civil action. If a public action is pending, the
civil court must suspend judgment until the public action is dis-
posed of (art. 4). In either case, the private action is time-barred si-
multaneously with the public (art. 10), so long as the private claim is
based directly on the violation of penal law.41
b) Advantages of the Action Civile: Costs
It appears that the subject of costs in private actions before
criminal courts is still somewhat uncertain. It is clear, at least, that
a private claimant who wins is entitled to full reimbursement of
costs; and that if the defendant is unable to pay, the state bears the
costs. 4 2 Apparently this also applies where the defendant is con-
victed, but the victim is found contributorily at fault (resulting in
approportionment of damages) or the amount of damages is reduced
on appeal.43
If the defendant is acquitted or if the private claimant loses on
some other ground, the latter bears the costs both of prosecution
and defense; but in any case the court may by express order relieve
the private party of this liability, on a showing of good faith (arts.
375, 475, c.p.p.). This power seems to have been utilized with some
liberality.44
The principal cost advantage of the action civile over the normal
civil lawsuit, then, lies in reducing the risk of having to pay the de-
fendant's costs.
c) Advantages of the Action Civile: Criminal Procedure
Beyond doubt the main advantage to be gained by the private
claimant in the action civile is the benefit of the inquisitorial proce-
dure of the French criminal courts. Once the public action is trig-
gered by the private action, it becomes the responsibility of the juge
d'instruction to proceed with an investigation, in which he is not in-
evitably dependent on the prosecutor or the private claimant, but
may invoke the full investigatory powers of the police. 45 The proc-
ess is faster and more efficient than the ordinary civil action, in
vate claimant in the case of lesser crimes would run the risk of losing the civil claim
altogether by res judicata for failure to prove all the elements of the crime.
41. Bouzat et Pinatel, supra n. 38 1075.
42. Id. 1451(B); c.p.p. arts. 375 (crimes), 475 (delits).
43. Encyclopedie Dalloz, Action Civile 527 (1974); Bouzat et Pinatel 1451.
44. Bouzat et Pinatel, id.
45. Encyclopedie Dalloz, Action Civile 13 (1974); Larguier, n. 35 supra, at 687.
On the diminishing investigative role of the juge dinstruction vis-A-vis the prosecutor
in France generally, see Goldstein & Marcus, "The Myth of Judicial Supervision in
Three 'Inquisitorial' Systems: France, Italy, and Germany," 87 Yale L.J. 240, 250-6
(1977).
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which the judge relies much more heavily on the parties to supply
information, and yet little power is given to the parties to obtain in-
formation from each other.46
d) Role of Groups and Associations
When we return to our motif of the mass claim, we find that
much debate has occurred in France over the proper role of associa-
tions as claimants in the action civile. For the moment, it appears
that this role is viewed with favor by the national assembly but not
by the courts. The problem is the familiar one of standing.
i) In General. The basic requirements for the action civile are
set forth in art. 2, para. 1, of the c.p.p.:
The private action for reparation of injury caused by a
crime, d4lit, or contravention belongs to anyone who has
personally suffered injury directly caused by the violation.
Because of the requirement that the injury be suffered personally
and directly, there is considerable debate on the standing of an as-
sociation or other group to pursue the action on the basis of injury
to its members as such. In particular, the civil and criminal cham-
bers of the Court of Cassation appear to have taken divergent ap-
proaches, the latter consistently hostile, the former more hospitable
to the group action.47
The most widely acknowledged breakthrough was a decision of
the Combined Chambers of the Court of Cassation in 1913, in which
the Union of French Winegrowers sought to intervene as partie
civile in the prosecution of a person charged with diluting wine with
water.4 The court held that the Union, created under an 1884 law
permitting formation of unions or trade associations in commerce,
industry and agriculture, had standing to litigate for the collective
interests of the trade or profession it represented. This right was
codified in 1920 and extended to the free professions, and it now ap-
pears as art. 411-1 of the new Labor Code:
Trade unions may exercise, before all jurisdictions, all
rights reserved to the partie civile in relation to acts which
directly or indirectly prejudice the collective interests of the
trades which they represent.
Under this provision union actions have been rejected because the
interests affected by the wrong were not those of the trade or profes-
46. It may be that the procedure under the new Code of Civil Procedure of 1975
will be a substantial improvement in efficiency; on the fate of earlier attempts see
Herzog, Civil Procedure in France 375 (1967).
47. Audinet, "La Protection Judiciaire des Fins poursuivies par les Associations,"
1955 Rev. Trim. 213, 216f; Encyclopedie Dalloz, Action Civile 283-4 (1974); Bouzat et
Pinatel 1010f.; Solus et Perrot, 1 Droit Judiciaire Privo 228-9 (1960).
48. Chambres R~unies, 5 April 1913, D.P. 1914.1.65, S. 1920.1.49.
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sion as such, but those of the public at large,4 9 or-as in the case of
a non-work-related assault on a member-those of an individual
member in a capacity other than membership in the trade.50 On the
other hand, a union has been allowed to pursue violations of the la-
bor laws (hours, working conditions, wages, etc.) even where the im-
mediate victim was not a member of the union, because the
collective interests of the trade are indirectly affected.51
In 1923, the Combined Chamber of the Court of Cassation pur-
ported to distinguish between unions and trade associations orga-
nized under a law of 1901.52 The case involved a civil action brought
by an association of public school teachers against the Archbishop
of Reims, for damages resulting from an episcopal letter accusing
the public schools of offending the faith of their pupils. The action
was rejected both on the ground that associations (as distinguished
from unions) do not have the right to represent the collective inter-
ests of their trades or professions, and on the ground that the honor
and integrity of a public function (education in the public schools)
are concerns of the state as such, and not of any functionary. While
this distinction between unions and other nonprofit associations has
been criticized as arbitrary, 53 it appears to survive and forms part of
the background against which the dialectic of restrictive case law
and expansive legislation has unfolded.
It is clear, of course, that an association as such can be the vic-
tim of a crime-as when its treasurer embezzles its fundsbL--and
that in such a case the association is a proper partie civile. Simi-
larly, where landowners formed a hunting association and assigned
to it, for the benefit of all members, hunting rights on their respec-
tive lands, the Criminal Chamber held that the association was a
proper partie civile in a prosecution of a poacher on a particular
member's land.55
When the individual interests of the group's members are in-
volved, rather than the collective interest of the group as such, the
Criminal Chamber has generally denied standing to the group. Two
1954 cases may serve as illustration, both involving books which de-
fended the collaborationist regimes during the Nazi occupation.
Bard~che's book blamed the execution and deportation of hostages
on the Resistance and the Jews; he was charged by associations rep-
resenting those groups with the crime of justifying murder, but the
49. Encyclopedie Dalloz, Action Civile 295-6 (1974).
50. Id.
51. Id. 299.
52. Chambres RLunies, 15 June 1923, S. 1924.1.49 note Chavegrain, D.P. 1924.1.153
note Rolland.
53. See Solus et Perrot, supra n. 47 s. 251 (1960).
54. Bouzat et Pinatel 1009.
55. Cass. crim. 3 Jan. 1925, D.P. 1925.1.85.
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Criminal Chamber found no direct and personal injury to the as-
sociations as such.56 Rassinier's book claimed that tales of persecu-
tion were exaggerated for sympathy, and generally insulted the
Resistance. In the action against him for defamation, the Criminal
Chamber held that the National Federation of Deportees and Intern-
ees of the Resistance had not been attacked personally, and group
defamation was not actionable.
57
The lower courts, on the other hand, have occasionally resisted
this approach. In Bard~che's case, on remand from the Court of
Cassation, the Court of Appeal of Orleans awarded nominal dam-
ages to the Federation of Associations of Former Jewish Volunteers,
because the book had attacked all French Jews as not true
Frenchmen-therefore, of necessity all members of the Federation.58
More recently and directly, the Court of Appeal of Colmar accorded
partie civile status to a true public-service association called "Move-
ment for Aid to all Distressed Persons," in an action against a mayor
who directed town employees to burn the camp of impoverished
gypsies about whom townspeople had complained. The Court em-
phasized precisely the fact that without the aid of such disinterested
groups the victims would have had no access to the courts, since
they had no money and the prosecutor had refused to take up their
complaint.5 9 The Assize Court of Paris has put the rationale most
succinctly, in awarding nominal damages to the Association
"Choisir" as partie civile in a prosecution for rape. The court found
that the Association's purpose-to protect women in danger-was
both distinct from that of the general public represented by the
prosecutor, and dedicated to a fundamental ethical and social value
worthy of legal protection; when the Association undertook, pursu-
ant to that purpose, to defend a woman against sexual crime, it suf-'
fered a direct, personal, real and certain harm cognizable in the
criminal courts. 60 Whether these lower courts can prevail against
the Criminal Chamber's continuing hostility61 must seem rather
doubtful.
A similar ambivalence of the courts toward associations appears
in the case of departmental federations of hunters and of fishermen,
established pursuant to the Rural Code arts. 396 (hunters) and 407
(fishermen). The federations are given semipublic status-one
must be a member of a departmental federation to get a hunting i-
cense, art. 396-and are charged with preventing poaching and im-
proper fishing, creating and maintaining preserves, and protecting
56. Cass. Crim. 11 Feb. 1954; 1954 Rev. Trim. 311 (No. 38), J.C.P. 1954.11.7994.
57. Cass Crim. 16 Dec. 1954, D.S. 1955, 287.
58. C. Orleans 12 Nov. 1954, 1955 Rev. Trim. 112.
59. C. Colmar 10 Feb. 1977, D.S. 1977, 471, note D. Mayer.
60. Cour d'assizes Paris, 15 Dec. 1977, D.S. 1978, 61, note D. Mayer.
61. E.g., Cass. Crim. 10 Nov. 1976, J.C.P. 1977.H.18709.
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and promoting reproduction of game and fish. While the lower
courts have frequently permitted the federations to act as parties
civiles for specific violations such as hunting without a permit or
out of season or with illegal weapons, or pollution of rivers, or fish-
ing with illegal tackle, etc., the criminal chamber of the Court of
Cassation has usually denied such status unless the federation as
such is directly affected, as by having to restock waters after a fish
kill by pollution, or replenish game reduced by illegal activity.62
Where a number of persons not otherwise associated are in-
jured by a violation, and they join together in an action civile, it ap-
pears that the joinder is permissible, though each probably must
prove his own damage;63 an association formed by them would be
without standing as an association."
ii) Statutory Authorization. While the debate in the courts
and the literature over the association as partie civile continues, 65
the legislature appears to be persuaded of the value of private orga-
nizations as aides to law enforcement, and has included specific au-
thorizations in a number of regulatory laws. Various formulas have
been used, which attempt on the one hand to relax the requirement
of directness of harm, and on the other hand to provide a means of
qualifying the organization.
A 1955 regulation of taverns provides:
Anti-alcohol leagues recognized as serving the public inter-
est [reconnues d'utilit6 publique] may exercise the rights
accorded to the partie civile ........ , or resort if they pre-
fer to the private action based on arts. 1382f. of the civil
code concerning acts contrary to the provisions of this
code.66
Under this provision the National Committee for Defense Against
Alcoholism has been allowed to complain, for example, of a drunk
driver who refused to give a blood sample, the damage being frustra-
tion of the Committee's need for statistics; 6 7 and of improper public-
ity for an aperitif in a Metro station, the damage being presumably
62. Bouzat et Pinatel 1014 (d); Encyclopedie Dalloz, Action Civile 328-335
(1974)..
63. Cass. Crim. 13 June 1972, Bull. Crim. 1972 No. 197; Cass. Crim. Oct. 17, 1972,
D.S. 1973 Somm. 61; Encyclopedie Dalloz, Action Civile 352.
64. Trib. corr. Seine, 19 Dec. 1957, D. 1958, 257.
65. Critical: e.g., Larguier, "L'Action Publique Menace," D. 1958 Chron. 29; at
least uneasy: Boulan, "Le Double Visage de l'Action Civile exercee devant la Juris-
diction Repressive," J.C.P. 1973.1.2563; positive: Audinet, "La Protection Judiciare des
Fins poursuivies par les Associations," 1955 Rev. Trim. 213; Vouin, "L'Unique Action
Civile," D.S. 1973 Chron. 265; Durand, "Defense de l'Action Syndicale," D. 1960 Chron.
21; Mayer, notes, D.S. 1977, 472, and D.S. 1978, 61.
66. Decree of 8 Feb. 1955, art. 96, D. 1955 L. 96.
67. C. Paris 20 March 1961, D. 1961, 563; 24 March 1961; 12 Jan. 1962 D. 1962, 227.
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the cost of additional countervailing advertising;68 and of opening a
tavern too close to a protected place 6 9 -- all while reiterating the prin-
ciple that the damage complained of must be distinct from that of
the general public represented by the prosecutor.70 The qualifica-
tion of the association as one "recognized as serving the public in-
terest," which has been suggested as a suitable general test for
associations in the action civile,71 draws on the 1901 law dealing
with the legal personality of nonprofit associations generally, which
requires such recognition by executive decree in order for an associ-
ation to qualify for receipt of donations.7 2
In 1956 the Family and Social Assistance Code was adopted,
which in art. 3 para. 4 authorized the national and departmental un-
ions of family associations to act as partie civile concerning acts af-
fecting the moral and material interests of the family. A 1973
decision of the Court of Appeal of Paris held that the sections of the
penal code dealing with the crime of offense against public morals in
effect superimposed on that authorization the requirement that the
unions obtain the imprimatur of the Secretary of State and the Min-
isters of Justice and Interior.7 3 The legislature thereupon amended
the Family Code provision to exempt the unions from that addi-
tional requirment,74 and in 1976 a Paris trial court allowed the de-
partmental union to litigate against producers of pornographic
films. 75
In 1972, a new art. 2-1 was added to the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure authorizing associations formed to combat racism to act as par-
tie civile, concentrating on the qualification issue and adopting the
very liberal test of five years existence.7 6
A potentially more dramatic authorization was made in 1973 in
the consumer field, as part of a law enacting, inter alia, prohibitions
68. Cass. Crim. 2 March 1960, D. 1960, 653.
69. Cass. Crim. 19 March 1975, D.S. 1975, Somm. 59; Encyclopedie Dalloz, Action
Civile 314-7.
70. See Tunc, note on two decisions of the Court of Appeal of Paris, D. 1961, 563;
note, 1967 Rev. Trim. 174-5.
71. Solus et Perrot, 1 Droit Judiciaire Prive 239 (1960).
72. Law of 1 July 1901, arts. 10-11, D. 1901.4.105. In general, the right to form as-
sociations without authorization or registration is established in art. 2 of the law, but
registration is a prerequisite to the acquisition of separate legal personality, arts. 5
and 6. Recognition of serving the public interest is then a third step, usually requir-
ing a substantial period of prior existence and activity, and providing not only the
right to receive donations and larger subscriptions but also to acquire immovables.
For a brief description see Amos & Walton, Introduction to French Law at 52-4 (3d ed.
Lawson, Anton & Brown, 1967).
73. Cass. Crim. 10 July 1973, J.C.P. 1974.11.17728.
74. Law No. 75-269, 11 July 1975, D.S. 1975.L.278.
75. Trib.gr.inst. Paris, 8 Nov. 1976, D.S. 1977, 320.
76. Law No. 72-546, 1 July 1972: "Any association, duly registered at least five
years before the act, which dedicates itself by its charter to fight racism, may exercise
the rights accorded to the partie civile concerning violations of arts. 187-1 and 416 of
the Penal Code."
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against various forms of price discrimination and deceptive advertis-
ing. Art. 46 of the rather vaguely titled "Law for the Guidance of
Commerce and the Crafts" (commonly known as the Loi Royer)
reads in part as follows:
..... (D)uly registered associations whose explicit charter
object is to defend the interests of consumers may, if they
are approved for that purpose, bring private actions before
any jurisdiction with respect to acts causing harm directly
or indirectly to the collective interest of consumers.77
An implementing decree contemplated by the provision requires a
showing of longevity, activity and representativeness, along with
certification by the Attorney General of the Court of Appeal for the
district in which the organization has its seat; the approval is issued
by joint decision of the secretary of state [garde des sceaux] and
the ministries of justice and of economics and finance.78 While a
comparatist has recently suggested that the Loi Royer remains in
this respect unexploited,7 9 it has in fact been applied in the courts.
In 1974, the Court of Appeal of Paris allowed a national federation of
consumer cooperatives, which had qualified under the 1973 law, to
intervene on behalf of the defendant-appellant in a civil action
against the author and publisher of a book which allegedly improp-
erly criticized various medicinal products.
80
In 1975, the legislature adopted the following provision regard-
ing the action civile in prostitution cases:
Any association recognized as serving the public interest,
having as a charter object the prevention of the white-slave
traffic and social action in favor of persons in danger of pros-
titution or persons who have submitted to prostitution with
a view toward helping them to renounce it, may bring a pri-
vate action before any jurisdiction where such action may
be brought, with respect to violations of the white slave pro-
visions of the penal code as well as those directly or indi-
rectly connected with white-slave traffic, which have
prejudiced directly or indirectly the mission which it ful-
fills. 8 1
77. Law No. 73-1193, 27 Dec. 1973, "d'orientation du commerce et de l'artisanat,'
art. 46, J.C.P. 1974.M1.41167. The courts had previously denied the action civile in
cases of improper pricing and sales practices, as affecting only the public interest, see
Bouzat et Pinatel 1000 at pp. 941-2.
78. Decree No. 74-491, J.C.P. 1974.m. 41736. It has been held that a professional
organization of electric appliance dealers is not a consumer organization qualified to
complain of misleading advertising of such products: trib.gr.inst. Rouen 19 March
1976, D.S. 1976, 367.
79. Von Hippel, "Der Schutz des Verbrauchers vor Unlauteren Allgemeine Ges-
chaiftsbedingungen in den EG-Staaten," 41 RabelsZ 237, 249n. 34 (1977).
80. Cour Paris, 20 Dec. 1974, J.C.P. 1975.Hl.18056.
81. Law No. 75-229, April 1975, D.S. 1975, L.117. See Pradel, "Le Renforcement de
la Lutte Contre le Proxenetisme," D.S. 1976, Chron. 31.
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In the environmental area, three recent laws have authorized
actions by associations: the Law Concerning Waste Disposal of 1975,
art. 26, permits associations recognized as serving the public interest
and principally devoted to environmental protection to act as partie
civile:82 the Law on Protection of Nature of 1976 accords standing as
partie civile in art. 14 to associations for the protection of animals,
and in art. 40 to environmental organizations approved by govern-
mental authority;83 the Law of 1976 reforming the Urban Code, art.
44, accords such standing to environmental associations which are
either recognized as serving the public interests, or regularly estab-
lished for three years and administratively authorized to act
(agr&es).84 In each of these statutes, however, in contrast to the
Loi Royer, the authorization is limited to specified violations defined
in the particular law, attempts to enact a more general provision for
the environmental area having failed.
85
2) Civil Cases
a) Joinder rules. Under both the old law86 and the New
Code of Civil Procedure, 87 it appears that there are no significant
barriers to the joinder in a single proceeding of many claims arising
out of a single wrongful act. Under the New Code art. 367 the judge
may order--on motion or sua sponte-consolidation of any cases
before him, where a sufficient connection exists between them so
that common investigation or adjudication is in the interest of jus-
tice. Under art. 101 a judge may transfer a case to another court if
there is such a connection with another case pending before the
transferee court. Under art. 332 the judge may ask the parties to
join ("forced intervention") any other persons interested whose
presence he deems necessary to resolution of the controversy. Any
person asserting a claim sufficiently connected with the original may
intervene (art. 325).
On the other hand, true representation of one claimant by an-
other, such as in our class action, is precluded or at least made very
cumbersome by the doctrine of "nul ne plaide par procureur," no
82. Loi No. 75-633, 15 July 1975, D.S. 1975.L. 281.
83. Loi No. 76-629, 10 July 1976, D.S. 1976.L.308. It has been held that the privilege
of art. 40 is limited to violations of the provisions there specified. Cass. Crim. 30 Nov.
1977, J.C.P. 1978.IV.33.
84. Loi No. 76-1285, 31 Dec. 1976, D.S. 1977.L.48. The procedure for obtaining au-
thorization under these environmental laws is now governed by Decree No. 77-760, 7
July, 1977, D.S. 1977.L.308. For a discussion of the early experience, noting a rather
astonishing number of associations seeking authorization, see Prieur, "L'agr6ment
des associations de protection de la nature et de l'environnement," D.S. 1978 Chron.
143.
85. See e.g., Delmas-Marty, note, J.C.P. 1977.11.18709.
86. See Herzog, Civil Procedure in France § 7.14 (1967).
87. Supra n. 15.
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one may sue by attorney. Short of a flat assignment of claims, 88 this
rule means that each party must be named in and served with all
pleadings and orders in the case, even if he has given a formal
power of attorney to another to act on his behalf.8 9
b) Scope of judgment. An interested person who is not
joined in the original suit is normally not entitled to the benefit of a
favorable judgment in that suit, in any subsequent separate action
against the common defendant.90 Thus the procedural economy of
issue preclusion, increasingly available to third persons in the U.S.
as the principle of mutuality of estoppel is being abandoned,91 is not
available in France. In each separate action based on the same
wrongful conduct, therefore, the claimant must offer separate proof
of the wrong.
c) Role of associations. It appears that in theory the
same principle applies to associations in purely civil actions as in
the action civile: i.e., the association may sue for injury suffered by
its members if the injury reaches every member personally.9 2 But
as already noted, the civil courts-though apparently much less fre-
quently called upon to decide group claims-have shown a greater
readiness than the criminal courts to find such injury by virtue of
collective interest.9 3
B) Standing of Groups in Administrative Courts
The law of standing in administrative courts is still based on the
case law of the Conseil d'Etat, assisted only by occasional legisla-
tion.94 In general, the Conseil d'Etat has been liberal in according
standing to groups or associations by finding a collective interest,
but it has stopped short of purely individual interests of particular
members.
Where the administrative decision is in the form of a rule, or
otherwise of general application, the Conseil d'Etat has never re-
quired that an association or union seeking review for lack of au-
thority (excis de pouvoir) show that every member of the group is
88. This brings its own difficulties: while the claim is normally assignable (Civ. C.
art. 1689), the obligor may obtain release by paying the assignee the consideration
paid for the assignment (art. 1699).
89. Herzog, Civil Procedure in France 249-50 (1967); Vincent, Pr~cis de Procedure
Civile 372 (6th ed. 1973).
90. See Herzog, supra n. 89 at 553.
91. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second (Judg-
ments), Tentative Draft No. 3 § 88 (1976), and references in the Reporter's Note at
170f.
92. See text supra, at n. 56-58; Solus et Perrot, 1 Droit Judiciaire Prive 237 (1960).
93. Supra n. 47.
94. E.g., Ord. 4 February 1959.L.304, art. 14 permitting civil servants to unionize
and to bring action in administrative courts to protect their collective interests.
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affected,95 although it may find in an unsympathetic case that the
group's own internal authority to act does not extend to the special
interests of some segment of the members. 96 In a classic case, the
Conseil allowed an association of property owners and taxpayers in
a city sector, formed after the streetcar company had discontinued a
route serving the area, to litigate the refusal of municipal authorities
to order resumption of the line.97
On the other hand, where the decision of which the group com-
plains is individual in form, the Conseil has been seen to distinguish
between those which go against an individual (e.g., denying promo-
tion, imposing discipline) and those which favor the individual (e.g.,
granting promotion). A group of persons including the affected in-
dividual is collectively affected in the latter case, in so far as promo-
tion granted to the individual is denied to others in the group; but
the former case is said not to affect the collective interest merely by
harming the individual.98 While this line of cases has been criti-
cized99 , its vitality appears not to be doubted. It is tempered, how-
ever, by the Conseil's willingness to allow the group to intervene in
support of the prejudiced individual's own complaint, 100 and also
perhaps by the presumed (but probably not much used) right of the
group to act in the name of a wronged member on the basis of a spe-
cial mandate from the latter.1°1
C) Conclusion
Group action in France-whether in the criminal, civil or admin-
istrative courts--can be seen to perform functions analogous to but
clearly not identical with those of the American class action. In
particular it permits representation of the collective interest of the
group, and may facilitate utilization of liberal joinder rules by indi-
vidual members with distinguishable interests. There appear to be
no legal inhibitions against the group's inviting individuals to join,
comparable to our threats of disciplinary action against lawyers for
solicitation of business, though the absence of discussion of the
problem may simply indicate that such conduct has not occurred.
Presumably the prosecutor himself, in the criminal case, could prop-
erly contact persons believed to have private claims resulting from
95. See de Soto, "L'Individualisme dans la Jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat," in 2
M6langes Offertes 6 Marcel Waline 759, 772 (1974).
96. Id. at 772-3.
97. C.E. 21 Dec. 1906, S. 1907.3.33, D. 1907.3.41.
98. Long, Wel & Braibant, Les Grands Arrfts de la Jurisprudence Administrative
72 (5.ed.1969); de Soto, supra n. 95 at 774.
99. See authors cited supra n. 98.
100. Long, Weil and Brabant at 72, citing C.E. 21 May 1953, Rec. 241.
101. C.E. 28 Dec. 1906, S. 1907.3.23, concl. Ronieu.
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the crime. 0 2
It is clear, however, that the device is useful for the representa-
tion of collective interests as affected by individual injury, princi-
pally where the legislature has made the substantive policy
determination that an act should be punishable and that associa-
tions should be enlisted in the enforcement machinery. So long as
the action civile remains a favored vehicle for other procedural rea-
sons, the opposition of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassa-
tion is likely to frustrate efforts toward judicial generalization of the
representative action.
The most obvious limitation of the French group action, even
where it is authorized by statute, is that the individual cannot take
the initiative in bringing the group's resources into the litigation.
The group must be a pre-existing one, and it must decide, on the ba-
sis of consensually established authority, to act on behalf of its
members; the individual can neither force the association to act
against its will nor personally assume the representative role.
Moreover, it appears that the association itself would not be entitled
to recover damages suffered by individuals as such, distinct from




1) Private Claims in Criminal Cases
The German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) contemplates
three forms of intervention by persons injured by a violation of pe-
nal law: (a) the private complaint (Privatklage), §§ 374f., in which
the victim takes the initiative in instituting prosecution; (b) the sub-
sidiary complaint (Nebenklage), §§ 395f., in which the victim joins in
a prosecution already begun by the public prosecutor; and (c) the
private claim for compensation (Adhdsionsprozess), §§ 403f., in
which the victim (whether or not he joins the prosecution as Privat-
or Nebenkldger) asserts a claim, subsidiary to the public prosecu-
tion, for compensation or other relief for injury suffered by reason of
any violation.
(a) Privat-and Nebenklage. § 374 lists a number of crimes
for which the private action is permissible, without first filing a com-
plaint with the public prosecutor. Those listed are minor crimes
(Vergehen), most of which can be prosecuted only on complaint of
the victim anyway.10 3 Costs are handled as in civil proceedings
102. Such, at any rate, is the assumption by Sloan, "Games French People Play
with Class Actions or French Games with Class," 45 Temple L.Q. 210, 226 (1972).
103. See Kern-Roxin, Strafverfahrensrecht § 64(B) (9th ed. 1969).
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(§ 379a), which means that the private prosecutor must put up an
advance cost reserve; the court can dismiss the action at any time
when it appears that the defendant's fault was minor (§ 383), in
which case (as well as that of acquittal) the private prosecutor bears
the defendant's costs (§ 471); and in most cases a formal attempt at
conciliation must be made before the action can be brought (§ 380).
As a result of these restrictions, the Privatklage is not much
used,1° 4 and at least one empirical study has shown that the courts
do as much as they can to discourage those that are brought.10 5
The Nebenklage is available not only where a Privatklage would
be, but also where a victim has successfully petitioned the court to
require the prosecutor to prosecute (Klageerzwingungsverfahren,
§ 170), as well as to the surviving kin in the case of a punishable
homicide. Since the prosecutor has by definition already begun the
main proceeding, the Nebenkldger is not required to put up security
for costs, nor will there be liability for costs.
(b) Adhdsionsprozess. The claim for compensatory dam-
ages subsidiary to a criminal action is available to the victim of any
crime (§ 403), but a number of features distinguish it from its
French counterpart. 10 6 First, only material interests can be pro-
tected (vermogensrechtlicher Anspruch). Second, no decision is
made on the claim if the defendant is not convicted of any crime
(§ 405). Third, the court can refuse to decide the private claim if it
would unduly delay the criminal proceeding (§ 405)-a circumstance
which is not at all unlikely in view of the relatively quick progress of
most criminal cases.1 07
On the other hand, the German statute expressly requires that
the victim be notified of the criminal proceeding (§ 403 para. 1.),
which presumably would include all identifiable victims of an of-
fense. While it is generally said that the Adhasionsprozess is not
much used because of these restrictions, 10 8 it was the vehicle for
one of the most notable mass claims in recent years, the
Thalidomide case. 0 9
104. Id. § 64 (A)(3).
105. Koewius, Die Rechtsvirklichkeit der Privatklage (1974).
106. See the comparison by Jolowicz, supra n. 8.
107. Kern-Roxin, supra n. 103 at §§ 66(A).
108. See Amelunxen, "Die Entschadigung eines durch eine Straftat Verletzten,"
ZgSW 86, 457 (1974). Langbein asserts, apparently on the basis of recent interviews
with judges and prosecutors, that the device is so little used that no attempt is made
any longer to notify potential claimants. Langbein, Comparative Criminal Procedure:
Germany 114 (1977).
109. The case was the longest criminal case in German history. The investigatory
stage began in 1962, and the trial itself lasted 2 1/2 years (1968-71). The decision of
the criminal court in Aachen, terminating the criminal proceeding on the basis of a
finding of "minor fault" and taking into account the effect on the defendants of the
lengthy proceedings, is found in 1971 JZ 507.
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Some time after a German physician reported findings in 1961
which linked thalidomide with birth deformities, a criminal action
was begun against responsible officers of the manufacturer of the
drug, which was marketed in Germany under the brand name Con-
tergan. A substantial number of the estimated 2,500 children who
were born victims of the drug joined the proceedings as
Nebenklager.110 In 1970, the officers and the manufacturer reached
a settlement with the Nebenklgern l with respect to their damage
claims, pursuant to which a trust fund of 100 mill. DM was estab-
lished by the company. The settlement called for a complicated
process in three steps: (1) claims asserted by children and parents
would be screened by a medical panel for causal relationship; (2)
the committee of trustees would approve claimants for participation
in the fund; and (3) a second committee of experts would determine
how to distribute the fund, evaluating claims on the basis of a pain-
and-suffering measure of damages. A claimant would then sign a
release from further liability before receiving payment of the
amounts specified." 2 It appears that the benefits of the settlement
were open to children not formally joined as Nebenklager, and most
(but not all) potential claimants did agree to the arrangement.
In late 1971, responding to political pressure, to the argument
that inadequate pharmaceutical laws were a major factor in the dis-
aster, and to the complaint that the settlement was inadequate, the
federal legislature enacted a law creating a Foundation for the
Assistance of Handicapped Children,1 1 3 one of the purposes of
which was to take over the function of distributing compensation to
the thalidomide victims. The law required the 100 mill. to be paid
over to the Foundation and called for an additional appropriation of
100 mill. DM, half of which was to be added to the settlement
amount exclusively for the thalidomide children." 4 Eligible chil-
dren (not limited to those who signed the settlement) would receive
a combination of lump-sum payments and annuities to be measured
with specific limits by the severity of the deformity and the
accompanying functional disability.115 Upon establishment of the
fund all claims from the settlement were to become moot
110. The charges included not only deliberate violation of the Pharmaceuticals
Law, but also aggravated battery, thus allowing Nebenklage: 1971 JZ 507.
111. The settlement is set forth in part in Zeschwitz, "Zum Gesetz Hilfswerk fir
behinderte Kinder,'" 1972 FamRZ, 476 at 477. The difficulties attendant on dis-
missing a prosecution conditioned on settlement of private claims, among other pro-
cedural problems in the case, are discussed in Bruns, "Ungeklairte
Verfahrensrechtliche Fragen des Contergan-Prozesses," in Zipf & Schroeder, Fest-
schriftt~r Maurach 469 (1972). See also Schultz, 1971 MDR 191.
112. Settlement agreement art. 7, Zeschwitz, id. at 477.
113. Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB1) 1971, Teil I, S. 2018. See the discussion in
Zeschwitz, supra n. 111.
114. Foundation law § 12.
115. Id. § 14.
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(gegenstandslos ).116
Certain beneficiaries of the settlement then sued the three
members of the trustee committee for a declaration that they were
obligated to pay the plaintiffs those amounts fixed pursuant to the
settlement out of the funds in their hands. The plaintiffs argued
that they might well be worse off under the Foundation than under
the settlement, and that the law establishing the Foundation consti-
tuted an improper expropriation. In addition, the company sued
the trustees to require payment to the Foundation. 117 In separate
opinions both the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof)"8
and the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)119
have now upheld the statute against this challenge. Since the pur-
pose of the statute was to improve the situation of the Thalidomide
children, by adding more funds and by assuring a more reliable and
uniform distribution of the funds, as well as providing a permanent
institution for the assistance of all handicapped children, there was
no improper expropriation.
120
The case is interesting because of its many procedural aspects,
which come very close to the treatment that would be accorded an
American class action of similar scope. An action is begun by the
prosecutor, possibly on complaint of one or more of the injured per-
sons, the latter probably with the assistance of a group called the
Organization of Parents of Children Injured by Contergan.121 Each
victim of the alleged crime is notified of the existence of the criminal
proceeding, and in effect invited to join. At least during settlement
negotiations, the claimants are represented by a single person who
eventually becomes one of the trustees. A settlement is reached on
behalf of all claimants, and each is invited to participate in the set-
tlement. The statute which supersedes the settlement is motivated
by concern that all affected children be compensated, even if they
were unwilling to litigate or were put off by the terms of the settle-
ment.122 It is not a typical case for Germany, to be sure, 123 but then
neither were class actions like Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
124
which have made so much law for the United States.
116. Id. § 23(2).
117. See B6hm, "Zum Gesetz iber die Errichtung einer Stiftung 'Hilfswerk ftr
behinderte Kinder'," 1974 NJW 842.
118. BGHZ 64, 30 (1975); 1975 NJW 1457.
119. 1976 NJW 1783.
120. This conclusion is strongly criticized by de Lazzer, "Ad-hoc-Dogmatismen:
zum Contergan-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," 1977 JZ 78.
121. See Bohm, supra n. 117 at 843.
122. The new Federal Pharmaceuticals Law of 1976 imposes strict liability under
certain conditions, which would quite probably obviate future resort to the criminal
process. See Kloesel, "Das Neue Arzneimittelrecht," 1976 NJW 1769.
123. See n. 111 supra.
124. 417 U.S. 156 (1974), with further references.
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2) Civil Cases
a) Joinder rules. The German Code of Civil Procedure
(ZPO) contains in §§ 59-63 a set of rules for joinder of claims very
similar to our federal rules. Multiple parties can join their claims in
a single action if they have a joint interest in the subject matter of
the lawsuit or if their claims are based on the same factual and legal
grounds (§ 59), indeed also if their claims are similar and based on
essentially similar factual and legal grounds (§ 60). This latter pro-
vision is said to be based on judicial economy and convenience, and
therefore to be liberally interpreted.
12 5
Officious representation of one party by another, as in France, is
excluded (§ 63),126 with a single exception: where the joinder of
claims is "necessary," a co-party who has been notified of a hearing
and fails to appear is represented, for purposes of that hearing, by
the co-parties who do appear (§ 62).127 It would seem that the obli-
gation to notify every co-party would apply even if all employ the
same attorney, so that at least that degree of paperwork and costs
could not be saved.
b) Scope of judgment. As in France, a judgment is bind-
ing only as between the parties, and a third person may not take for-
mal advantage of favorable judgments to which he was not a party.
The principle is embodied in art. 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
c) Role of associations: in general. The right of an associ-
ation to litigate the claims of its members in its own name has been
recognized in Germany, but with two basic requirements: (i) there
must be a contractual authorization, which may be inferred from the
appropriate language in the association's charter; and (ii) the associ-
ation must have an interest of its own in pursuing the claims.
128
Thus, in one decision the Bundesgerichtshof held that an association
of brewers could sue an antique dealer to recover beer flasks be-
longing to its members, but that it could not exercise in its own
name a power of attorney given by other associations to recover
flasks belonging to their members, the plaintiff having no interest of
its own in property belonging to non-members. 129 Such a power of
representation, of course, does not absolve the plaintiff from having
to prove the individual claims it purports to pursue, to the extent
125. See Baumbach-Lauterbach-Albers-Hartmann, Zivilprozessordnung § 60
Anm. 1. (32d ed. 1974).
126. "The right to prosecute the action belongs to each co-party; all co-parties
must be notified of every hearing."
127. See Baumbach-Lauterbach, Zivilprozessordnung § 62 Anm. 4(B) (30th ed.
1970).
128. Rosenberg-Schwab, Zivilprozessrecht § 46.111.1 (10th ed. 1969); Kotz, supra n.
26 at 90-91.
129. BGH Oct. 5, 1955; 1956 ZZP 69, 30.
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that individual relief is sought.130 If such an action results in judg-
ment, it will bind the individual member.13 1
c) Statutory authorization. In a few areas the German
legislature has given associations the right to sue in their own
names without specific or general authorization from individual
members, but recent efforts to extend the right more generally to
the consumer and environmental fields have been largely unsuc-
cessful.
The most prominent Verbandsklage is found in § 13 of the Law
Against Unfair Competition (Gesetzgegen den unlauteren
Wettbewerb (UWG)). The section distinguishes between associa-
tions protecting professional or business interests and those protect-
ing consumer interests, with respect to the specific prohibited
practices which can be sued upon, and it is specifically limited to
prohibitory relief. For example, a business group can sue to enjoin
commercial bribery (§ 12), while a consumer group cannot; con-
sumer groups can sue to enjoin practices against good morals
(§ 1) only if these involve false or misleading information with re-
spect to goods or services touching the essential interests of con-
sumers; consumer groups can sue to enjoin close-out sales not
involving an entire business, branch, or product line (§ 7 (1)), while
business groups cannot.132
Another such provision is § 35 of the Law Against Restraints of
Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen (GWB)).
While the first paragraph gives a private claim for damages to per-
sons whom the violated norm was intended to protect, the
Verbandsklage in the second paragraph is limited to prohibitory re-
lief, and only to business groups. There is considerable debate over
whether consumers are within the scope of interests intended to be
protected by the cartel law, but it appears to be the prevailing view
that they are not,133 so that even a purely representative role for
consumer associations would be excluded.
Most recently the Verbandsklage has been introduced into the
1976 Law on General Terms and Conditions. 134 The statute makes a
number of specified standardized clauses either presumptively or
absolutely void, and in § 13(2) provides for an action to prohibit the
use of invalid clauses, which action may be brought only by con-
sumer associations, trade associations, or chambers of industry and
130. See e.g., Bettermann, "Zur Verbandsklage," 1972 ZZP 85, 133 at 134.
131. Rosenberg-Schwab, supra n. 128 § 46.V.4.
132. On the availability of an individual claim of the consumer for violation of the
UWG, see Schricker, "Soil der einzelne Verbraucher ein Recht zur Klage wegen un-
lauteren Wettbewerbs erhalten?", 1975 ZRP 189.
133. Goll, "Verbraucherschutz im Kartellrecht," 1976 GRUR 486, esp. 492; K6tz,
supra n. 26 at 89.
134. AGB Gesetz: transl. 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 568, with article by Sandrock, "The
Standard Terms Act 1976 of West Germany," id. at 551.
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commerce. Moreover, § 21 permits anyone, apparently not limited
to members of the complaining group, to invoke a prohibitory judg-
ment so as to invalidate clauses covered by the judgment. This con-
stitutes an unprecedented departure from the normal rule. 135 At
least one writer has seen (but not discussed) possible constitutional
difficulties with § 21.136
While there have been arguments for generalizing the
Verbandsklage by analogy from the specific statutory authoriza-
tion,137 there is wide agreement that a statutory provision is essen-
tial.13 Recent attempts to introduce the Verbandsklage into the
Federal Pollution Law139 and the Federal Law for the Protection of
Nature 40 have so far been unsuccessful. For the most part, there-
fore, the role of groups and associations in the protection of their
members remains an auxiliary one, that of providing information,
expert assistance and perhaps also financial assistance to members
litigating in their individual capacity. 14 1
B) Standing of Associations Before Administrative Courts
In contrast to the U.S. and France, Germany has maintained a
restrictive policy toward standing to sue in the administrative
courts. 42 The question is governed by § 42 (II) of the Administra-
tive Courts Law, which requires that a claimant be injured by an ad-
ministrative act in his own right (in seinen Rechten), and the courts
have interpreted this provision as excluding associations from liti-
gating on the basis of injury to their members, not to mention liti-
gating in the public interest. 143
135. See IV(2)(b) above, and e.g., Rosenberg-Schwab, Zivilprozessrecht § 157
(10th. ed. 1969).
136. Muller-Graaf, "Das Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Ge-
schaftsbedinggungen," 1977 JZ 245 at 245f.
137. Wolf, Die Klagebefugnis der Verbande (1971), reviewed by Bettermann, n. 130
supra.
138. E.g., Bettermann, n. 130 supra.
139. Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB1) 1974.1.721. See e.g., Rehbinder, "Argumente fur
die Verbandsklage im Umweltrecht," 1976 ZRP 157; Redeker, "Verfahrensrechtliche
Bedenken gegen die Verbandsklage," 1976 ZRP 163; Rupp, "Popularklage im Umwelt-
schutzrecht?", 1972 ZRP 32.
140. BGBI 1976.1.3574. See Rehbinder, supra n. 139; Moller, "Das Neue
Bundesnaturschutzgesetz," 1977 NJW 925 (930).
141. See the discussion of this role in K6tz, supra n. 26 at 90 f.
142. On the other hand there is liberal provision for standing to be heard in the
administrative process itself: Rehbinder, "Controlling the Environmental Deficit:
West Germany," 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 373, 376-7 (1976). The new Administrative Proce-
dure Law ( Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, VwVfG 1976), contains a broad provision in
§ 13(2) allowing the administrator to join as party anyone whose legal interests are
affected (diejenigen, deren rechtlichen Interessen ... beruhrt werden). Indeed the
law also provides that where more than 50 persons join in the same petition, the court
may require designation of a representative from among the group, and absent such
designation may then appoint the representative itself (§ 17).
143. See Rehbinder, supra n. 142 at 380.
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For individual standing, the administrative courts have also fol-
lowed a rather restrictive policy, insisting not only that the plaintiff
be injured by an administrative act, but also that the act be in viola-
tion of a norm intended for his protection (Schutznormtheorie).'"
Where a large number of individuals can meet standing require-
ments regarding a single administrative act, on the other hand, § 64
of the Administrative Courts Law incorporates by reference the
joinder rules of the Code of Civil Procedure' 45 so that it is possible
to join them all as co-parties and by agreement to establish a single
representative for purposes of the litigation.
CONCLUSION
The class action, American style, is in the strictest sense un-
known in France and Germany, because neither recognizes the right
of one member of a group of persons to sue for all without the prior
consent of each. Many of the conditions for the rise of the class ac-
tion for damages in the U.S.-the contingent fee, the responsibility
of the winning party to bear his own attorney's fees--do not exist in
those countries, and it is at least somewhat more feasible there for a
person with a small claim to sue individually. This is especially so
in France, where the claimant may piggy-back his claim on the crim-
inal process wherever any sort of criminal penalty is provided by
law, and yet escape cost consequences as loser in many instances.
Further it appears that many of the purely procedural economies
claimed for the class action can be achieved in French and German
courts-albeit through a more laborious consensual process.
Nonetheless, group action is increasingly important in the form
of litigation by pre-formed associations of persons of like inter-
est-aptly termed "intermediate societies" by Cappelletti146 -and
considerable pressure is being brought to bear on the legislatures to
expand their role. It already appears that a substantial number of
such associations has arisen in both France and Germany, now ac-
tive in assisting their members extra-judicially, and ready to go to
court when the law permits. In view of our own arguments over the
desirability of class actions-the self-appointed character of the rep-
resentative, the unseemly entrepreneurial role of the lawyer-and of
the effect of a number of recent restrictive decisions in the trend-
setting federal system, it seems likely that the role of pre-formed
groups in providing legal assistance to their members will be the
wave of the future in the U.S. as well. Indeed, to the extent that the
144. Rehbinder, id. at 378; Martens, Die Praxis des Verwaltungsprozesses § 5
(1975); Martens, "Einftihrung in die Praxis des Verwaltungsprozesses," part II, 1973
JuS 425, 426f.
145. See text supra at n. 125-128.
146. CappeUetti, supra n. 5 at 678f.
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chief hope for the class action is not purely procedural economy but
equalization of resources for expensive litigation, extra-judicial for-
mation of "intermediate societies" is a far more logical and promis-
ing solution. In this we could do worse than to examine the
European models.
A couple of points suggest themselves in this preliminary look
at France and Germany. First, with the exception of the rather uni-
que Thalidomide Children's Case in Germany, group action does not
appear to have been a fruitful vehicle for large money damage
awards. Even where, as in France, a group is permitted to claim
damages for collective injury, the amounts recovered have usually
been small or even nominal (unfranc de dommage-intrets) and the
main purpose of the action has been to ensure enforcement of the
law. The majority of statutes authorizing the group action in France
has involved intangible interests such as public morals, racism,
prostitution, or highly diffuse interests such as urban planning and
the environment. In Germany the few instances of authorized Ver-
bandsklage contemplate only prohibitory relief. In general, the
role of the damages award as a deterrent to wrong-doing is not
nearly so highly prized in France and Germany as in the U.S.
Second, and perhaps just as notable from our point of view, both
European countries have considered the need, in authorizing group
action, to include some mechanism for screening the groups them-
selves, with a view to ensuring at least minimal commitment to their
stated purposes and capacity to fulfil that commitment. The French
requirements-recognition as serving the public interest, length of
existence, or governmental approval-appear to vary in inverse rela-
tion to the perceived need for encouragement, perhaps directly with
the likelihood of proliferation of organizations in the field. This
question of the practical capacity of the group or class representa-
tive to pursue litigation effectively has been a vital one for us as
well, but we have generally left that to the courts for ad hoc deci-
sion. Whether we would find legislative or bureaucratic regulation
palatable is very much open to doubt.
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